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CHAPTER 1
Carpe Diem
Abstract This chapter, the introduction to Practical Economics,
discusses the challenge of ﬁxing a broken country and describes
the situation in Georgia in the early 2000s. The author, Georgia’s
former prime minister, Nika Gilauri, explains why he believes that
other countries can learn from the reforms he oversaw between 2004
and 2012. The chapter contains an overview of the impact of this large-
scale transformation in areas ranging from corruption and doing
business to economic growth and energy supply, as well as a personal
account of how Mr. Gilauri, a political novice at the time, became a
member of the cabinet in 2004.
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As I said, you never know when you will get a chance to do something
good for your country. For me, the call of duty came in December 2003,
shortly after the Rose Revolution. I didn’t recognize the number on my
phone’s display, but I had a distinct feeling that something important was
about to happen. I took the call.
“Hello?”
“Hi, this is David. I am calling from the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce. He
would like to see you.”
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“Of course. I’m on my way.”
I was stunned. I had never met the prime minister. I didn’t know any
other cabinet members either. I had attended the protests on Rustaveli
Avenue the previous month, but I had not met any of the leaders.
I really had no idea why the prime minister wanted to see me.
How did his ofﬁce even get my number? Was it related to my job?
I was working in the energy sector at the time, and I had a reputation as a
critic of the government’s energy policy. Perhaps they had come to me
for an insider’s perspective? Or had I done something wrong and was
about to be reprimanded? But why would the prime minister deal with
me personally?
Either way I looked at it, this was big. I hurried to the State Chancellery.
The prime minister was sitting in his ofﬁce by himself. We exchanged very
brief hellos.
“What do you think about the energy sector in Georgia?”
“Excuse me, but how do you even know about me?”
“Irrelevant. Answer my question.”
I described some of the challenges I had encountered, but he quickly
interrupted me.
“How long do you need to prepare a presentation about the energy
sector?”
“Until tomorrow?”
“Tomorrow? That’s not possible.”
“I already have a presentation. I just need to go over it one more time.”
He looked puzzled.
“Did you know that this is why I asked you to come here today?”
“No, but I have been working on improvement ideas for the energy sector
for some time.”
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I wasn’t lying. I was so fed up with the blackouts, the mismanagement,
and the corruption that I had written down my thoughts on how to make
it work. But I had not shown this to anyone.
“Okay, come back the day after tomorrow.”
When I went back, the prime minister was not alone. About half a dozen
people were gathered at the table, including his chief of staff and the minister
of ﬁnance. I started my presentation. The prime minister interrupted me
with a question, but I asked him to let me continue and save his questions for
later. I said this simply because the answer to his question was on my next
slide, but the second I had said it, I was afraid I might have been overly
brusque. Curiously, everybody present seemed to be impressed withmy bold
move, especially the prime minister himself.
“I think we have found our man.”
He was whispering, but everybody heard him. I went on, but he interrupted
me again.
“Will you be my Minister of Energy?”
Now it was my turn to look puzzled.
“Huh?”
“How old are you?”
“28.”
“That’s very young, but we are a revolutionary government. We have to
revolutionize everything. There are opportunities in your life that you
should not say no to. So will you be the Minister of Energy of Georgia?”
I mustered all my courage.
“On one condition.”
“What’s that?”
“I will not cut my hair.”
At the time, my hairstyle was not what most Georgian’s would have
described as ministerial.
“Of course. No problem.”
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1.1 LEARNING FROM GEORGIA
Why should you read this book, even if you are neither Georgian nor a
student of the country and its history? Because the lessons learned in
Georgia between 2004 and 2012 are applicable to many other countries,
both developing and developed. Here is why:
• In that period, Georgia was the closest thing to a laboratory for
political and economic reform you will ﬁnd in real life.
• In that short period, Georgia went through more political permuta-
tions and economic cycles than many other countries experience in a
century.
• Although the transformation happened under unique circumstances,
the challenges Georgia faced will be familiar to governments in many
countries.
Think of this book as a blueprint for successful transformation, and I’m
sure you will ﬁnd something of value in it, wherever you live and whatever
your position is.
1.1.1 Laboratory of Reforms
The nine-year period after the Rose Revolution was one of those rare
occasions when the vast majority of the population is yearning for change.
The new government enjoyed an 80 percent approval rating when it started
conducting its reforms. In November 2003, during the Rose Revolution,
people had taken to the streets, demanding a new government. When that
new government was in place, they demanded fast reforms across the board
– political, economic, and social. The major factions in Georgia’s society
were on the same page – politicians, common people, captains of industry,
intellectuals, and even the opposition.
There was broad consensus that change needed to come fast, if it was to
come at all. The new government duly adopted what was sometimes referred
to as the Big Bang approach.Wewould reform everything, and we would do
it quickly. Instead of drafting comprehensive development plans, taking one
step at a time, and reviewing progress every step of the way, we went in like
the mavericks we were. We decided to do and learn, rather than to sit and
wait. We were aware that we would get some things wrong at ﬁrst, but we
were willing to take that risk and prepared to learn from our mistakes.
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From the get-go, we were determined to take inspiration from success-
ful reforms in other countries, much the way I encourage the readers of
this book to take inspiration from Georgia. We studied what other coun-
tries had done in similar situations, where they had succeeded, where they
had failed, and what mistakes they had made along the way. We took what
worked and adapted it to the new political reality and the speciﬁc local
requirements in Georgia.
Post-revolution Georgia was the rare case of a country tackling reforms in
all areas: ﬁscal and monetary policies; welfare, healthcare, and education;
and public accountability, security, and agriculture. Nothing was left out.
What makes this case so rare is the fact that most governments initiate
reforms in one or two areas but almost never across the board. This is due
to the fact that most societies are not ready to embrace change on this scale.
All things considered, we set out to build a modern state – not from scratch
but from the ruins left by decades of corruption and neglect – 70 years of
Soviet regime; Russian-led wars on the Georgian territory and a civil war in
the post-Soviet 1990s; and corrupt and criminal government’s rule in late
1990s through early 2000s. The starting position was not the best.
1.1.2 Everything that Could Have Happened, Had Happened
Between 2004 and 2012, Georgia went through more political, social, and
geopolitical permutations than most countries see in a century or their entire
history: a peaceful revolution; local, parliamentarian, and presidential elections;
country-wide protests organized by the opposition that paralyzed the capital
city; breaking up the protests and announcing a curfew that eventually led to
early presidential elections; dealing with breakaway regions and a Russian
invasion; wartime management of supplies and ﬁnances; sheltering internally
displaced persons; and battling the inﬂuence of crime syndicates that had
effectively ruled the country for decades. Each stage had its own challenges,
and – in most cases – its own success stories, many of which I tell in this book.
Georgia did not only go through all kinds of political change in the
period in question, but all major economic cycles as well: economic growth,
economic downturn, pre-election economics, and even the economic chal-
lenges speciﬁc to times of armed conﬂict. Each of these situations has its
own dos and don’ts, and Georgia got it right under pretty much all
circumstances. Despite the combined effects of a legacy of debt, the world
ﬁnancial crisis, the Russian invasion, and local political tensions, Georgia
came out of the recession quicker than any of its neighbors.1 Even during
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the war with Russia in 2008, the economy ran like clockwork. Not even the
prices of food products increased. In 2004, we found that not only had the
previous government emptied all coffers at the treasury and state-owned
entities but the outstanding pensions and salaries for government employees
added up to 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). We were broker
than broke. But in 2012, we handed over positive balance of just under
10 percent of GDP to the incoming government. Debt had decreased to
34.8 percent of GDP, and external reserves had increased by a factor of ten
in nominal terms and almost quadrupled as a percent of GDP (Fig. 1.1).
1.1.3 Unique, but Exemplary
There is no debating the fact that the geopolitical circumstances under
which we made our reforms were exceptional. The country was in sham-
bles, and its surrounding region was in disarray. At the time, nobody would
have bet on Georgia to transform itself from a failed state into a growing
democracy over the course of a single decade. And yet it happened. U.S.
President George Bush called Georgia a “beacon of democracy” for the
region, a part of the world in which free markets and modern institutions
were virtually unknown at the time. What is more, we were up against
repeated Russian attempts to undermine Georgia’s development model
and growth path, a string of events that culminated in the 2008 invasion.
At the same time, the challenges Georgia faced along its transformation
journey resemble those many other countries struggle with: weak institu-
tions, widespread corruption, inefﬁciency of the public sector, a low level
of economic development, insufﬁcient infrastructure, limited prospects of
growth and prosperity, a tainted international image, etc. Many countries
try and fail to solve these problems, sometimes over the course of many
decades. Georgia solved these problems, and I invite other countries to
take advantage of the lessons that we learned along the way.
1.2 GEORGIA BEFORE AND AFTER
Between 2004 and 2012, Georgia was transformed from a failed state that
faced bankruptcy into a stable economy with excellent growth prospects.
Here is an overview of some of the telltale indicators of this transforma-
tion: corruption, ease of doing business, economic growth, and energy
supply.
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1.2.1 Corruption
In 2003, Transparency International’s Global Corruption Index revealed
Georgia to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world (ranked
127th out of 133), along with or behind much of Africa and many former
Soviet Union countries, and a long way away from “clean” countries such
as the United States, Canada, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and much of
Western Europe. Georgia was on par with Angola and behind Zimbabwe
and Republic of Congo.2 Even small businesses needed “krishas,” a
Russian term that describes a “caretaker” who is well connected with the
government, to survive. To get a job as a police ofﬁcer that paid USD
20 per month, you had to pay a USD 2000 bribe. It was still a worthwhile
investment because you didn’t live on the salary but rather on the bribes.
Trafﬁc police ofﬁcers would actually pay bribes to their superiors to have
additional trafﬁc signs and trafﬁc lights put up – not to improve safety on
the streets, but to increase their opportunities to take bribes. In the
Corruption Barometer survey, about 80 percent of Georgians said that
corruption was a major part of their lives.
In 2010, Transparency International conducted a similar survey, asking
nationals of 183 different countries whether they, or amember of their family,
had paid a bribe in the past 12 months. Only 4 percent of Georgians said that
they had, compared with 5 percent in the European Union (average) and the
United States. Georgia was outranked only by a handful of countries, includ-
ing the United Kingdom, Canada, Singapore, and New Zealand.
In the 2012 Global Corruption Index, Georgia was ranked 51st out of
174 countries, ahead of many EU countries such as Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Latvia, and just behind South Korea.3 According to the 2012
Corruption Barometer, Georgians reported only very few cases of corruption
(none when dealing with the revenue service, 2 percent when dealing with
utilities, 4 percent when dealing with the police, and 5 percent when dealing
with the court system), one of the best results in the world. To make this
happen, the government did not shy away from radical measures. For
example, the entire trafﬁc police force (16,000 employees) was ﬁred in one
day, in July 2004, and trafﬁc was much safer without the trafﬁc police on the
streets. They were replaced with a new, well-paid, much smaller force of
about 2500 ofﬁcers. If they were caught taking a bribe, they went to prison.
Before, police ofﬁcers had been hiding behind corners to demand a bribe as
soon as a driver ran a red light. After the cleanup, ofﬁcers were out in the
open, warning drivers not to run a red light or turn right where it wasn’t
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allowed. This goes to show that innate corruption does not exist. Corruption
is a disease. Every nation wants to get rid of it. If the time is right, and all
forces in society pull together, it can be eradicated in a very short period of
time. If there were such a thing as innate or cultural corruption, Georgia
would still be as corrupt a country as it was just a decade ago.
1.2.2 Ease of Doing Business
In 2006, Georgia ranked 112th in the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing
Business” report, just behind Nigeria and Kyrgyzstan. At the time, BP
was the only foreign investor, and even this was just because the pipeline
the company was building (from Baku in Azerbaijan to Ceyhan in Turkey)
passed through Georgia.
In 2012, Georgia was the only developing country that made the top
ten of the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business 2013” report, as well as
the only country to make the jump from a rank below 100th place to the
top ten, reaching 8th place, just behind the United Kingdom and
Denmark, and ahead of Germany and South Korea. Georgia was number
one worldwide in the “registering property” category, third in “dealing
with construction permits,” fourth in “getting credit,” and seventh in
“starting a business.” In 2011, the World Bank proclaimed Georgia the
world’s top reformer for the period 2006 to 2011 (Figs. 1.2 and 1.3).
1.2.3 Economic Growth
In 2003, Georgia was widely regarded as one of the least developed
countries in the World. GDP per capita was only USD 922. The govern-
ment’s budget revenues were less than 7 percent of GDP, although taxes
were higher than in any other country in the region. The unemployment
rate was 17 percent. Growth prospects were grim, given the very limited
natural resources and low level of foreign direct investment.
By 2012, Georgia had quadrupled its economy in nominal terms and
doubled its GDP per capita in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). So
far, it is among only a handful of non-oil exporting countries to have
achieved such growth in the twenty-ﬁrst century. According to my
research, only 18 non-oil exporting countries have managed to double
their GDP per capita in terms of PPP in any given decade since 1980 –
Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Ireland, China, Latvia, Lithuania,
and some other former members of the Soviet Union. Georgia did it
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consistently in all decades ending between 2006 and 2012, i.e., GDP per
capita in terms of PPP in every one of those years was twice what it had
been ten years before – 2006 vs. 1996, 2007 vs. 1997, and so on, through
2012 vs. 2002. Georgia’s achievement is even more remarkable in light of
the worldwide ﬁnancial crisis that broke out in 2007 and the military
invasion by Russia in 2008.
Not only has the Georgian economy grown at an average rate of 6.7
percent between 2003 and 2012, one of the highest growth rates among
countries worldwide that do not produce oil, it also was the fastest country
in its region to come out of the recession that was triggered by the world
ﬁnancial crisis (Figs. 1.4 and 1.5).
1.2.4 Energy Supply
In early 2000s, Georgia suffered from the worst power shortage in the
region. The Ministry of Energy itself was without electricity. During the
winter months, the country’s utilities delivered electricity only for two
hours per day. People took to the streets, demanding to know when exactly
they would get their two hours. They had long given up hope of 24-hour
electricity supply. In the evenings, you could actually hear people shouting
“hurray” every time that electricity supply was restored. At the same time,
stealing electricity was a national sport. One of the more innovative tech-
niques that some customers used to cheat distribution companies was a
sensor-based remote control that switched on the meter when an inspector
came within a four-meter radius of the meter (from beyond four meters it
was impossible to see whether a meter was running or not).
By 2007, less than three years after the new government had taken
ofﬁce, not only did Georgia enjoy 24-hour electricity supply but it had also
become a net electricity exporter, supplying electricity to all neighboring
countries. Total distribution losses (including commercial and technical
losses in the distribution network) decreased from more than 60 percent
to less than 8 percent (Fig. 1.6).
1.3 ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT
If the transformation was such a success story, why did Georgia’s ruling party
lose the elections in October 2012? Was it because the reforms went too far?
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The biggest mistake the government made was not to reform the
justice system in time. Even though some changes were introduced, the
pace was slow and the results were barely visible. For example, in 2010,
98 percent of all cases, both criminal and civil, were settled in favor of
the prosecutor’s ofﬁce. The prosecutor’s ofﬁce in some cases abused its
powers, especially when dealing with local businesses. This was a period
when businesses were learning to pay taxes. In majority of cases, the
deals made by prosecutor’s ofﬁce were understandable – there were
clear cases of tax evasions, but as it appeared there were cases where the
approach was excessively harsh and by far not fair. As a result, people
got frustrated with the inappropriate conduct of the prosecutor’s ofﬁce.
Defenders of the harsh approach say that this was the only way to
break the overpowering inﬂuence of crime families, bring the crime rate
down, and root out corruption. They are right, and in fact, many
citizens initially accepted the hardline approach as necessary. Severe
diseases call for severe treatment. Centralizing power and showing no
mercy were the right remedies during the ﬁrst ﬁve years after the Rose
Revolution. But by 2010, the rule of corruption and crime had been
broken. The mentality of the population had changed. Before 2004,
crime and corruption had been the norm. When you asked teenagers
what they wanted to grow up to be, most of them said that they
dreamed of becoming a “thief in law,” a local expression referring to
the head of a crime family. But only a few years later, most teenagers
said that they wanted to become a police ofﬁcers or businesspeople,
according to a survey conducted in 2010.
Once these results had been achieved, however, the justice system should
have been thoroughly reformed. But this reform never came. As a result,
citizens felt that they were being treated unfairly by the government. This
frustration set inmotion a course of events that eventually led to the defeat of
the ruling party in the 2012 elections. In Getting Georgia Right, Svante
Cornell puts it this way: The government ofGeorgia “found that to build the
state, they [government] had to centralize power and exert stronger control
over society and moribund state institutions. A functioning state is a pre-
requisite for liberal and constitutional democracy, rather than the other way
around. Especially for a country subjected to the type of external pressure
that Georgia has been, it would be utopian to believe that a liberal democ-
racy could develop without the framework of a sovereign and functioning
state. Thus, the priority accorded to state-building was understandable. The
problem in Georgia was that the revolutionaries [ . . . ] failed in some areas to
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halt the practice – perhaps necessary in the early years – of cutting corners in
terms of due process and the rule of law.”4
Failing to reform the justice system was not the only reason the ruling
party was defeated in the 2012 elections. Another reason was that the
ruling team started to believe that it was unbeatable. It had performed
nothing short of an economic miracle, after all. Thousands of corrupt and
underperforming civil servants had been ﬁred. Despite these and many
other initially unpopular reforms, the ruling party had won numerous
local, presidential, and parliamentary elections. It had survived the
Russian invasion and a coup staged by an oligarch.5 It could simply not
imagine losing an election to anyone. In fact, some people still struggle to
accept the fact that they lost in 2012. This sense of invincibility weakened
the team. If you think that your team is immune to outside challengers,
unhealthy internal competition will arise, and your political radar will
invariably deteriorate.
So it’s not for a lack of success of its reforms that the ruling party was
defeated. It was defeated because the reforms did not go far enough,
and because the many successes instigated an unhealthy sense of com-
placency in the top team. I encourage the readers of this book to
take inspiration from Georgia’s successes and learn from its mistakes.
To this date, our reform agenda was the most comprehensive and – all
things considered − most successful of such efforts in the twenty-ﬁrst
century.
NOTES
1. The only year of economic decline was 2009 (−3.9 percent). By 2010, the
economy was growing again – at a rate of 6.4 percent. The average growth
rate between 2003 and 2012 was 6.7 percent. See subsequent chapters for
details.
2. Georgia was on par with Angola, Cameroon, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan,
behind Libya (118th), Sierra Leone, the Republic of Congo (joint 113th),
and Zimbabwe (112th). The only countries that were ranked below Georgia
were Myanmar, Paraguay, Haiti, Nigeria, and Bangladesh (Transparency
International Report for 2003).
3. In 2012, Georgia ranked 51st, ahead of many EU countries, such as the
Czech Republic, Latvia (joint 54th), Croatia, Slovakia (both 62nd),
Romania (66th), Italy (72nd), and Bulgaria (75th), and just behind South
Korea and Lithuania (Transparency International Report for 2012).
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4. http://www.martenscentre.eu/sites/default/ﬁles/publication-ﬁles/get
ting_georgia_right_-_website.pdf (retrieved in May 2016).
5. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/georgian-billionaire-
declared-enemy-of-the-state-is-found-dead-in-surrey-exile-782016.html
(retrieved in May 2016).
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